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Abstract
There is significant concern that technological ad-
vances, especially in Robotics and Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI), could lead to high levels of unemploy-
ment  in  the  coming  decades.  Studies  have  esti-
mated that around half of all current jobs are at risk
of  automation.  To  look  into  this  issue  in  more
depth,  we  surveyed  experts  in  Robotics  and  AI
about the risk, and compared their views with those
of non-experts. Whilst the experts predicted a sig-
nificant number of occupations were at risk of au-
tomation in the next two decades, they were more
cautious than people outside the field in predicting
occupations at risk. Their predictions were consis-
tent with their estimates for when computers might
be  expected  to  reach  human  level  performance
across a wide range of skills. These estimates were
typically  decades  later  than  those  of  the  non-ex-
perts. Technological barriers may therefore provide
society with more time to prepare for an automated
future than the public fear. In addition, public ex-
pectations  may  need  to  be  dampened  about  the
speed of progress to be expected in Robotics and
AI.  
1 Introduction
The World Economic Forum has predicted that we
are the beginning of a Fourth Industrial Revolu-
tion in which developments in areas like Robotics
and Artificial  Intelligence will  transform the na-
ture of our economies and eliminate many current
occupations [WEF 2014]. At the same time, these
technologies  will  also create many new occupa-
tions. It remains an interesting question whether
more or fewer jobs will be created than destroyed.
In the past, more jobs have been created than de-
stroyed but this may be the case in the future as
we are likely to have fewer and fewer advantages
over the machines. Whatever the case, it is likely
that the new occupations created will require dif-
ferent skills to those destroyed. For instance, au-
tonomous vehicles will probably be commonplace
on our  roads  within the  next  few decades.  Taxi
and truck drivers will therefore need other skills
than just the ability to drive if they are to remain
employed. It is thus an important question for our
societies in preparing for this future to understand
the occupations at risk of automation.
2 Background
In 2013, a study by Frey and Osborne estimated
that 47% of total employment in the United States
was  under  risk  of  automation  in  the  next  two
decades [Frey and Osborne 2013]. Ironically, the
study used Machine Learning to predict  occupa-
tions at risk. Even the occupation of predicting oc-
cupations at risk from automation has been par-
tially automated. Subsequent studies have reached
similar conclusions. For instance, similar analysis
has  estimated  that  40% of  total  employment  in
Australia is at risk of automation [Durrant-Whyte
et al. 2015], and even larger figures for develop-
ing countries like China at 77% and India at 69%
[Frey  et  al. 2016].  Frey and Osborne suggested
three barriers to automation:  occupations requir-
ing complex perception or manipulation skills, oc-
cupations requiring creativity, and occupations re-
quiring social intelligence. Computers are signifi-
cantly challenged in these three areas at  present
and may remain so for some time to come.
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Frey and Osborne’s study used a training set of 70
occupations from the O*Net database of U.S. oc-
cupations. This training set was hand labelled by a
small group of economists and Machine Learning
researchers at a workshop held in the Oxford Uni-
versity Engineering Sciences Department. Classi-
fication was binary. Each occupation was classi-
fied either at risk in the next two decades from au-
tomation or not. Labels were only assigned to oc-
cupations where there was confidence in the clas-
sification. 
We do not wish to discuss here whether the O*Net
database provides features adequate to extrapolate
to the full set of 702 occupations. This is a diffi-
cult question to address as we do not have a gold
standard  of  occupations  actually at  risk.  Their
classifier did, however, perform well on the train-
ing set with a precision (positive predictive value)
for occupations at risk of automation of 94%, a
sensitivity of  81%, and a specificity of 94%.  
We focus instead on the training set of 70 occupa-
tions used in [Frey and Osborne 2013]. This study
hand labelled 37 of these 70 occupations as being
at risk of automation (53%). The final accuracy of
the classification of 702 occupations depends crit-
ically  on  the  accuracy  with  which  this  smaller
training  set  was hand labelled.  This  training  set
was chosen as it could be classified “with confi-
dence”.  We  therefore  gave  this  training  set  to
three  much larger  groups to  classify:  experts  in
AI, experts in Robotics and, as a comparison, non-
experts interested in the future of AI. In total over,
we  sampled  over  300  experts  and  500  non-ex-
perts. Our survey is the largest of its kind every
performed.
3 High level machine intelligence
In  addition  to  classifying  the  training  set,  we
asked both the experts and the non-experts to esti-
mate  when  computers  might  be  expected  to
achieve  a  high–level  of  machine  intelligence
(HLMI). This was defined to be when a computer
might  be  able  to  carry  out  most  human profes-
sions  at  least  as  well  as  a  typical  human.  In
2012/2013, Vincent C. Müller and Nick Bostrom
surveyed  170  people  working  in  AI  to  predict
when  HLMI  might  be  achieved  [Müller  and
Bostrom 2014]. As there is significant uncertainty
as to when HLMI might be achieved, they asked
when  the  probability  of  HLMI  would  be  10%,
50% and 90%. The median  response for a  10%
probability of HLMI was 2022, for a 50% proba-
bility  was 2040, and for a  90% probability  was
2075. We wanted to see if people who were more
cautious at predicting when HLMI was likely to
be achieved were also more cautious at predicting
occupations at risk of automation. 
We  also  wished  to  update  and  enlarge  upon
Müller and Bostrom’s survey. Given some of the
high profile advances made recently in subareas
of AI like Deep Learning [LeCun  et al. 2015], it
might be expected that HLMI would be predicted
sooner  now  than  back  in  2012/2013.  We  also
wanted to survey a much larger sample of experts
in AI and Robotics than Müller and Bostrom. 
Only  29  of  the  170  who  answered  Müller  and
Bostrom’s  survey  were  leading  experts  in  AI,
specifically 29 members of the 100 must cited au-
thors in AI as ranked by Microsoft Academic Re-
search. The largest group in their survey were 72
participants of a conference in Artificial General
Intelligence (AGI). This is a specialized area in AI
where researchers are focused on the question of
building general intelligence. Much research in AI
is, by comparison, focused on programming com-
puters to do very specialized tasks like playing Go
[Silver et al. 2016]  or interpreting mammograms
[Patel  et  al. 2017]  and  not  on  building  general
purpose intelligence. 
Researchers in AGI might be expected to be pre-
disposed to the early arrival of HLMI. Indeed the
AGI group were the most enthusiastic to complete
Müller  and Bostrom’s  survey.  64% of  the  dele-
gates from this AGI conference completed the sur-
vey, compared to an overall response rate of just
31%.  In  addition,  the  AGI  group  typically  pre-
dicted HMLI would arrive earlier  than the other
respondents to the survey. We conjectured that ex-
perts  in  AI  and  Robotics  not  focused  on  AGI
would be more cautious in their predictions.
More  recently  in  March  2016,  Oren  Etzioni
wanted to test a similar hypothesis about Müller
and Bostrom’s results [Etzioni 2016]. To do so, he
sent out a survey to 193 Fellows of the Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI). In total, 80 Fellows responded (41% re-
sponse rate). Respondents included many leading
researchers  in  the  field  like  Geoff  Hinton,  Ed
Feigenbaum, Rodney Brooks, and Peter Norvig. 
Unfortunately,  Etzioni’s  survey asked a different
and  simpler  question  (“When  do  you  think  we
will achieve Superintelligence?” where Suprintel-
ligence is defined to be “an intellect that is much
smarter than the best  human brains in practically
every field, including scientific creativity, general
wisdom and social skills”).  Etzioni’s survey also
only offered 4 answers to the question of when
Superintelligence would be achieved (in next 10
years, 10-25 years, more than 25 years, never). 
It is difficult  to compare the results  of Etzioni’s
survey with  Müller  and Bostrom’s.  None of the
AAAI Fellows responding selected “in the next 10
years”, 7.5% selected “in the next 10-25 years”,
67.5% selected “in more than 25 years”, and the
remaining  25%  selected  “never”.  If  Etzioni’s
question  is  equated  with  Müller  and  Bostrom’s
question about a 90% probability of HLMI then
the responses of the two surveys appear to be sim-
ilar.  However,  it  is  very difficult  to  draw many
conclusions given the rather ambiguous question,
and the larger granularity on the answers.
4 Methods
Our survey was performed between 20th January
and 5th February 2017. The survey involved three
distinct groups. The first group were authors from
two leading AI  conferences:  the  annual  Confer-
ence of the Association for the Advancement  of
Artificial  Intelligence  (AAAI-2015),  and the  In-
ternational  Joint Conference on Artificial  Intelli-
gence (IJCAI-2011). Both conferences are highly
selective and publish some of the best new work
in AI. 200 authors from this group completed our
survey. 
The second group consisted of IEEE Fellows in
the IEEE Robotics & Automation Society and au-
thors of a leading Robotics conference: the IEEE
International  Conference  on Robotics  and Auto-
mation (ICRA-2016). This is also a highly selec-
tive  conference  that  publishes  some of  the  best
work in Robotics. We sent out questionnaires to
this second group till we had at least 100 replies.
In total, 101 people from this group completed the
survey.  
The third and final group surveyed were readers
of  an  article  from  the  website  “The  Conversa-
tion”.  This  Australian  and  British  website  pub-
lishes  news stories and expert  opinion from the
university  sector,  and  is  partnered  with  Reuters
and the Press Association.  The article containing
the like to the survey was entitled “Know when to
fold ‘em: AI beats world’s top poker players”. The
article  discussed the recent  victory of the CMU
Libratus poker program against some top human
players. It used this as an introduction to the Frey
and Osborne report on tasks that could be auto-
mated. It ended by inviting readers to help deter-
mine the “wisdom of the crowd” by completing
the survey.  There were 548 responses in this third
group. 
The readers of The Conversation have the follow-
ing geographical distribution: 36% Australia, 29%
United States, 7% United Kingdom, 4% Canada,
and 24% rest of the world. It is reasonable to sup-
pose that they most are not experts in AI & Robot-
ics, and that they are unlikely to be publishing in
the  top  venues  in  AI  and  Robotics  like  IJCAI,
AAAI or ICRA. They are educated (85% have an
undergraduate  degree  or  higher),  young  (more
than a third are 34 or under, 59% are under 44 and
just 11% are 65 or older), mostly employed or in
higher  education  (more than  two thirds  are  em-
ployed and one quarter  are  in  or about  to  enter
higher education) and relatively affluent (40% re-
ported an annual income of $100,000 or more).
The questionnaire itself had 8 questions. The first
7 questions asked respondents to classify 10 occu-
pations from the training set, whilst the last asked
for estimates when HLMI might arrive. The first
question asked for a classification of the 5 occu-
pations most at risk from automation according to
Frey and Osborne’s classifier as well as the 5 oc-
cupations least likely to be at risk. To help respon-
dents, a link was provided next to each occupation
describing  the  work  involved  and  the  skills  re-
quired. The second question in our survey asked
for a classification of the next 5 occupations most
at risk from automation according to Frey and Os-
borne’s classifier and the next 5 occupations least
likely, and so on till the seventh and penutlimate
question. Within each of the 7 questions, the 10
occupations  were  presented  in  a  random  order.
Our  intent  was  to  make the  initial  questions  as
easy as possible to answer. In this way, we hoped
that  participants  would  not  give  up  early,  and
might be better prepared for the potentially more
difficult classifications later in the survey. 
The 8th and final question asked for an estimate
of when there was a 10%, 50% and 90% chance
of  HLMI.  The  options  presented  were:  2025,
2030,  2040,  2050,  2075,  2100,  after  2100,  and
never. To compute the median response, we inter-
polated  the  cumulative  distribution  function  be-
tween the two nearest dates.
5 Results
The results  are summarized in Table 1.  The ex-
perts in Robotics were most cautious, predicting a
mean and median of 29.0 out of the 70 occupa-
tions in the training set  at  risk from automation
(95% confidence interval of 27.0 to 31.0 occupa-
tions at risk). The experts in AI were slightly less
cautious predicting a mean of 31.1 occupations at
risk and a median of 33 (95% confidence interval
of 29.6 to 32.6 occupations at risk). 
The difference in means between the Robotics and
AI experts does not appear to be statistically sig-
nificant. A two-sided student t-test on the number
of  occupations  predicted  at  risk  of  automation
failed to reject the null hypothesis that the popula-
tion means were equal at the 95% level (p value
of 0.096).  
Group Sample size (n)
Predicted Number of Occupations Likely at Risk of Automation 
(out of 70)
Mean Median Standard deviation Confidence 
interval
Robotics 
experts
101 29.0 29 10.1 (27.0, 31.0)
AI experts 200 31.1 33 10.8 (29.9, 32.6)
Non-experts 473 36.5 37 10.9 (35.6, 37.5)
Table 1. Descriptive statistics about number of occupations predicted to be at risk of automation in next
two decades. Confidence intervals are at the 95% level.
The non-experts in our survey typically predicted
significantly more occupations were at risk of au-
tomation than the experts. They predicted a mean
of 36.5 occupations at  risk of automation and a
median of 37 (the 95% confidence interval is from
35.6 to 37.5 occupations at risk). 
The  differences  between  the  predictions  by  the
non-experts of the number of occupations at risk
of automation and those of either the Robotics or
the AI experts appear to be extremely significant
statistically. Two-sided student t-tests rejected the
null hypothesis that the population means for the
non-experts  and  the  experts  in  Robotics  were
equal, and the null hypothesis that the population
means for the non-experts and the experts in AI
were equal (both p values less than 0.0001).  
The prediction by the non-experts in our survey of
the number of occupations at risk of automation
of a median of 37 occupations at risk is identical
to the 37 occupations labelled at risk in the origi-
nal training set in the original Frey and Osborne
study.
At the end of the survey, we asked participants to
estimate  when there  was a  10%, 50% and 90%
probability  of  HLMI.  This  repeats  a  question
asked in the original Müller and Bostrom survey.
Also, as in Müller and Bostrom’s survey, we de-
fined HLMI to be when a computer can carry out
most human professions at least as well as a typi-
cal human. 
The  results  of  this  question  are  summarized  in
Figure 1. The Robotics and AI experts  typically
predicted that HLMI was several decades further
away than the non-experts. Again, there was little
to  distinguish  between the  AI  and Robotics  ex-
perts themselves, but they were much more cau-
tious than the non-experts in their predictions. The
experts  typically  predicted  HLMI  was  several
decades further away than the non-experts.
For a 90% probability of HLMI, the median pre-
diction of the experts in Robotics was 2118, and
2109 for  the experts  in  AI.  By comparison,  the
median prediction of the non-experts  for a 90%
probability of HLMI was just 2060, around half a
century earlier. For a 50% probability of HLMI,
the median prediction of the Robotics experts was
2065, and 2061 for the AI experts. This compares
with the non-experts whose median prediction for
a 50% probability of HLMI was 2039, over two
decades earlier. Finally, for a 10% probability of
HLMI, the median prediction of the Robotics ex-
perts was 2033, and 2035 for the AI experts. By
comparison, the median prediction of the non-ex-
perts for a 10% probability of HLMI was 2026,
nearly a decade earlier.  
The predictions for the number of occupations un-
der  risk of  automation  were consistent  with the
predictions  of  when  HLMI  might  be  achieved.
See  the  clear  trend  in  Figure  1/d.  Respondents
who predicted a later date for HLMI typically pre-
dicted  fewer  occupations  at  risk  of  automation.
Similarly  respondents  who  predicted  an  earlier
date for HLMI typically predicted more occupa-
tions at risk of automation. The AI and Robotics
experts  typically  predicted later  dates for HLMI
and fewer occupations at risk. On the other hand,
the  non-experts  typically  predicted  earlier  dates
for HLMI and more occupations at risk of auto-
mation. 
The respondents  in  Müller  and Bostrom’s  study
were closest  in their  predictions of when HLMI
might be achieved to the group of non-experts in
our  survey.  For  a  10%  probability  of  HLMI,
Müller and Bostrom’s study had a median predic-
tion of 2022, and 2040 for a 50% probability of
HLMI. For a 10% probability of HLMI, the non-
experts in our study had a median prediction of
2026, and of 2039 for a 50% probability of HLMI.
However,  for  a  90%  probability  of  HLMI,  our
non-experts were more optimistic than the respon-
dents in Müller and Bostrom’s study. The median
prediction for a 90% probability for HLMI by the
non-experts in our survey was 2060, compared to
a median of 2075 in Müller and Bostrom’s study.

6 Discussion 
Our results  suggest that experts in Robotics and
AI  are  more  cautious  than  non-experts  in  their
prediction of the number of occupations at risk of
automation in the next decade or two. The experts
were also more cautious than the training set used
in Frey and Osborne’s study. This caution can be
explained  by  their  expectation  that  HLMI  may
take  several  decades  longer  than  the  public
expects.  We  did  not  find  any  significant
differences between the predictions of the experts
in Robotics and the experts in AI.  Despite being
more  cautious,  both  groups  of  experts  still
predicted a large fraction of occupations were at
risk of automation in the next couple of decades. 
There are many other factors that need to be taken
into  account  in  deciding  the  impact  that
automation might have on employment: we must
also take account of the economic growth fueled
by  productivity  gains,  the  new  occupations
created by technology, the effects of globalization,
changes  in  demographics  and  retirement,  and
much else. It remains an important open question
if there will be an overall net gain or loss of jobs
as  a  result.  This  is  a  matter  that  society  must
seriously consider further. There are many actions
possible  to  reduce  the  negative  impacts  of
automation.  We  should,  for  instance,  look  to
augment  rather  than  replace  humans  in  roles
where this is possible. 
Even in occupations where humans look set to be
displaced, our survey holds out some hope. Whilst
the potential disruptions may be large, there could
be more time to adapt to them than the public fear.
Our study also suggests that more effort needs to
be invested in managing the public’s expectation
about the rate of progress being made in Robotics
and AI, and of the many technical obstacles that
must be overcome before some occupations can
be automated. Robotics and AI remain challenged
in  several  fundamental  areas  like  manipulation,
common  sense  reasoning  and  natural  language
understanding. Funding  for  AI  research  has
suffered  “winters”  in  the  past  where  public
expectations  did  not  match  actual  progress
[Hendler  2008].  We  should  be  careful  to  avoid
this in the future.
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